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This paper examines a recent example of
evidence-based decision making affecting
social policy at the trial court level. It offers
a close reading of Carter v Canada (AG),
decided by the British Columbia Supreme
Court, and of Justice Lynn Smith’s careful scrutiny of the social science evidence
when invalidating the Criminal Code prohibition on assistance in dying. Drawing
on literature which examines the legal system’s use of social science evidence and
expert witnesses, this paper suggests that
Justice Smith’s treatment of the evidence
in Carter provides an example of skilled
judicial treatment of the extensive amounts
of social science evidence typically tendered in Charter challenges related to controversial social issues. First, it considers
the implications of the Supreme Court of
Canada’s revised approach to social fact-
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minutieux de la preuve issue des sciences
sociales par la juge Lynn Smith en invalidant l’interdiction du Code criminel sur
l’aide à mourir. En se fondant sur la littérature portant sur l’utilisation des preuves de
la science sociale et des témoins experts au
sein du système juridique, cet article suggère
que le traitement de la preuve effectué par
la juge Smith dans Carter offre un exemple
de traitement judiciaire adroit des quantités
importantes de données issues des sciences
sociales, habituellement présentées lors de
contestation au nom de la Charte portant sur
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finding by trial judges and the consequent
need for trial judges to critically evaluate and effectively draw on the social sciences. Second, it examines certain limits
to courts’ institutional capacity to evaluate
the work of social scientists – specifically,
the general lack of judicial training in disciplines other than law – and suggests that the
trial judge’s approach in Carter is one to
be emulated in future cases with similarly
vast evidentiary records. Third, it looks at
the role of the expert witness and at some
of the dangers inherent in judicial reliance
on expert testimony and highlights the ways
in which Justice Smith’s careful consideration of the subtle effects of adversarial bias
may have affected her approach to the evidence. It suggests that while some judges
might struggle with common risks and challenges associated with judicial reliance on
this type of evidence in the adjudication of
social policy, the trial decision in Carter
demonstrates that these difficulties may be
overcome.
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des enjeux sociaux controversés. D’abord, il
examine les implications de la nouvelle approche de la Cour suprême du Canada face
aux données sociales recueillis par les juges
de première instance et la nécessité qui en
découle pour ceux-ci de les évaluer de manière critique et de tirer efficacement les
conclusions nécessaires en fonction de ces
sciences sociales. Deuxièmement, il examine certaines limites à la capacité institutionnelle des tribunaux d’évaluer le travail des
chercheurs en sciences sociales – particulièrement, le manque général de formation
juridique dans des disciplines autres que
le droit – et suggère que l’approche adoptée par la juge de première instance dans
Carter devrait être imitée lors de cas futurs présentant des dossiers de preuve aussi
vastes. Troisièmement, il se penche sur le
rôle du témoin expert et sur quelques dangers inhérents de la confiance accordée aux
tribunaux aux témoignages d’experts et met
l’accent sur la façon dont la prise en compte
minutieuse des effets subtils de la partialité,
par la juge Smith, peut avoir influencé son
analyse de la preuve. Il suggère que, bien
que certains juges pourraient avoir des difficultés avec les risques et les défis associés
à la déférence judiciaire vis-à-vis de ce type
de preuves, la décision Carter en première
instance démontre que les difficultés avec
des preuves issues des sciences sociales
dans processus de décision des politiques
sociales peuvent être surmontées.
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Introduction
People often speak of evidence-based decision making in matters of
public policy and legislation. Since the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), however, sensitive policy decisions
have not been limited to the legislative sphere. Nor is the use of evidence
in developing policy limited to our elected representatives. In some cases,
the idea of approaching questions affecting social policy based on a solid
evidentiary foundation characterizes the judicial task as much as it does that
of the legislature. Adjudication essentially involves deciding matters based
on the best available evidence.1
In this paper, I examine a recent example of evidence-based adjudication affecting social policy, Carter v Canada (AG) (Carter BCSC).2 I consider the trial judge’s use of social science expert evidence in the British
Columbia Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Carter BCSC invalidating
the criminal prohibition on assisted death in Canada. That decision laid the
evidentiary foundation for the Supreme Court of Canada’s unanimous ruling, in 2015, that it is unconstitutional for the law to prohibit individuals
“suffering intolerably as a result of a grievous and irremediable medical
condition” from deciding to end their lives on their own terms.3

1

This paper assumes that in adjudicating rights disputes under the Charter, the
Canadian judiciary has the potential to effect significant change with respect
to social policy. Stated otherwise, this paper accepts that Charter adjudication
implies some sort of lawmaking role for judges. See e.g. Donald M Brown,
“Practice with the Charter” (1989) 23:3 UBC L Rev 595 at 596, on the “enhanced ‘lawmaking’ role now vested in the judicial process.” For further reading on the respective roles of the judiciary and the legislature with respect to
policy matters see Peter W Hogg & Allison A Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue
between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such
a Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 75; Luc B Tremblay,
“The Legitimacy of Judicial Review: The Limits of Dialogue between Courts
and Legislatures” (2005) 3:4 NYU Intl J Cont L 617; Peter W Hogg, Allison A
Bushell Thornton & Wade K Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited: Or ‘Much
Ado About Metaphors’” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1; Andrew Petter, “Taking Dialogue Theory Much Too Seriously (Or Perhaps Charter Dialogue Isn’t
Such a Good Thing After All)” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 147; The Honourable Chief Justice John D Richard, “Separation of Powers: The Canadian
Experience” (2009) 47:4 Duq L Rev 731.

2

2012 BCSC 886, 287 CCC (3d) 1 [Carter BCSC].

3

Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5 at para 3, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter SCC].
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In looking at the trial decision in Carter BCSC, I offer a close reading
of a fresh example of judicial reliance on social science evidence. Drawing
on the literature examining the legal system’s use of social science evidence
and expert witnesses, I suggest that Justice Lynn Smith’s treatment of the
evidence in Carter BCSC provides an example of skilled judicial treatment
of the extensive amounts of social science evidence typically tendered in
Charter challenges related to controversial social issues.4 Given the capable
treatment of the evidence, I further suggest that while some judges might
struggle with common risks and challenges associated with judicial reliance
on social science evidence, Justice Smith’s approach provides an example
to be emulated by judges dealing with similar evidentiary records in the
context of social policy disputes. Further, my reading of the case, combined
with the relevant literature, enables me to suggest avenues of further research into ways to improve the adjudicative system’s use of social science
evidence, so that all judges – and, by extension, litigants – may properly
benefit from the valuable insights of the social sciences.
I approach this reading of Carter BCSC in three parts. In Part I, I examine the role of the trial judge. I posit that the trial decision in Carter BCSC
serves as a testing ground for the Supreme Court’s new approach to social
fact-finding by trial judges. In reviewing the decision, the Supreme Court
refused to distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts for the purposes of appellate review.5 I consider the implications of this move and
the consequent need for trial judges who are able to critically evaluate and
use social science evidence, given the increased weight that now rests on
their shoulders. In Part II, I examine certain limits to courts’ institutional
capacity to evaluate the work of social scientists – specifically, the general
lack of judicial training in disciplines other than law – and suggest that the
trial judge’s approach in Carter BCSC is one to be emulated in future cases
with similar evidentiary records. In Part III, I look at the role of the expert
witness. I highlight the problem of adversarial bias – one of the principal
dangers inherent in judicial reliance on expert testimony, the typical vehicle

4

As I explain below, I use the term “skilled” as it is understood and described in
the relevant literature and case law.

5

Carter SCC, supra note 3 at para 109. Adjudicative facts are the specific facts
of the case at hand. Legislative facts are more general in nature and help to
establish the social context of a case. Previously, appellate judges were free to
review legislative factual findings in the absence of demonstrated error. As I
explain below, the Supreme Court recently did away with the distinction as it
applies to the standard of appellate review. See Part I, below, for more on this
topic.
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by which social science evidence is brought to court. Here, I highlight the
ways in which Justice Smith carefully considered the potential effects of
bias and suggest that where judges are less discriminating in their evaluation of expert evidence, the bias that may result from the adversarial model
of adjudication has the potential to delegitimize judicial review of social
policy.
In approaching this project, I read the trial decision in Carter BCSC
against a backdrop of wide-ranging literature and case law dealing with
the perils and promises of social science evidence in the courtroom, both
in Canada and abroad. I examined all of Justice Smith’s comments relating
to the nature of the evidence before her and her treatment of it, so as to determine whether the evidentiary issues encountered resonated with the risks
and challenges discussed in the literature. I sought to determine whether
one experienced judge’s approach to a larger than usual evidentiary record validated or contradicted the existing literature. My evaluation of the
evidentiary approaches was based on the widely accepted norms identified
in the relevant literature; I looked closely at each instance of the weighing
of contradictory evidence, and, as I explain below, at the considerations
cited for the decision to accept one witness’s evidence over another’s. I
sought out examples of the common challenges associated with judicial use
of this type of evidence and attempted to highlight potentially problematic
evidence – and the judge’s treatment of it – brought forward by parties on
both sides of the litigation. Finally, this paper does not take a position on
the many legal issues in dispute; in reading Carter BCSC, my focus was on
the judicial reliance on and use of the evidence, and not on the substantive
legal analysis.
This paper builds on the wealth of literature on the judicial use of social science evidence, and is premised on the idea that the legal system has
much to gain from the social sciences, particularly with respect to rights
adjudication with the potential to seriously impact social policy.6 Its goals,

6

Much has been written on the rich contributions that empirical evidence from
the social sciences can bring to the law. See e.g. John Monahan & Laurens
Walker, “Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law” (1986) 134:3 U Pa L Rev 477; Tracey L Meares & Bernard E
Harcourt, “Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure” (2000) 90:3 J Crim L & Criminology 733; Sujit
Choudhry, “So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 SCLR
(2d) 501; Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Deference: The Role of Social
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however, are limited. It does not weigh in on the question of undue deference to social science evidence tendered by the government,7 although the
decision in Carter – both at trial and at the Supreme Court – may enrich that
debate. Nor does it delve into the questions related to legal education and
training, which, as I suggest below, might ground further research related to
the critical evaluation of empirical evidence by jurists.8 Rather, this paper
should serve primarily to highlight the judicious treatment of the evidence
in Carter BCSC, so that others may attempt to replicate Justice Smith’s
capable approach. In doing so, it necessarily exposes some of the potential
perils of reliance on empirical data under the current system of adjudication
in Canada and identifies possible routes toward overcoming the associated
challenges.

I. The New Weight of Social Science Evidence
The finding in Carter SCC that the criminal prohibition on physician
assistance in dying is unconstitutional will have an immeasurable impact
on the deaths – and lives – of Canadians suffering from incurable illnesses.
But the trial judgment is meaningful for reasons beyond that aspect of the
decision. The Carter case might be described as part of a new generation of
Canadian adjudication: high-stakes constitutional litigation of controversial
social policy issues with vast evidentiary records grounded in the social sci-

Science Evidence in Election Law Cases” (2014) 32:2 NJCL 173; Jodi Lazare,
“When Disciplines Collide: Polygamy and the Social Sciences on Trial” (2015)
32:1 WYAJ 103.
7

Existing literature on the use of social science evidence in constitutional adjudication often criticizes the ease with which courts tend to defer to government on social policy matters when that evidence is complex or seemingly
inconclusive. See e.g. David Wiseman, “The Charter and Poverty: Beyond
Injusticiability” (2001) 51:4 UTLJ 425 at 441–42; Niels Petersen, “Avoiding
the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional
Adjudication” (2013) 11:2 NYU Intl J Cont L 294; Michael Pal, “Democratic
Rights and Social Science Evidence” (2014) 32:2 NJCL 151; Lazare, supra
note 6 at 117–120.

8

See Geoffrey Conrad & Jodi Lazare, “The Lawyer in Context: Toward
an Integrated Approach to Legal Education” in Ruth Sefton-Green, ed,
« Démoulages » : du carcan de l’enseignement du droit vers une éducation juridique (Paris: Société de Législation comparée, 2015) 45 (on the deficiencies
of legal education with respect to training in non-legal subjects).

S42

McGill Journal of Law and Health
Revue de droit et santé de McGill

Vol. 10
No. 1

ences.9 Much of that evidence was presented by expert witnesses. This Part
will suggest that the Supreme Court’s new approach to the evidence in these
kinds of cases means that its critical evaluation by trial judges is paramount.
It will also explain the value in examining the treatment of the evidence in
Carter BCSC.
A. Why critical evaluation matters
Expert evidence is valuable in elucidating complex facts, often not directly related to the parties to the litigation. Unlike adjudicative facts, which
make up the “who did what, where, when, [and] how” of the case – that is,
the immediate facts giving rise to the dispute – legislative facts – the social
and economic facts surrounding a dispute – are often “introduced into evidence through the use of expert witnesses at trial.”10 Legislative facts rely on
“social and economic data to establish a more general context for decisionmaking.”11 They are, in other words, the same type of facts that legislators
look at in developing social policy.
The distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts was conceptualized in order to differentiate between applicable evidentiary approaches.12 Historically, this distinction extended to the different treatment of the
two types of facts by appellate courts – a distinction that persisted until recently in Canada. Prior to 2013, whereas appellate courts could not, except
in cases of gross error on the part of the trial judge, revisit adjudicative facts,

9

For other examples, some dealing with health policy, see e.g. Chaoulli v Québec (AG), 2005 SCC 35, [2005] 1 SCR 791 [Chaoulli]; Canada (AG) v PHS
Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134; Canada (AG) v
Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 [Bedford].

10

John Hagan, “Can Social Science Save Us? The Problems and Prospects of
Social Science Evidence in Constitutional Litigation” in Robert Sharpe, ed,
Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 213 at 215. See also Graham Mayeda, “Taking Notice of Equality: Judicial Notice and Expert Evidence
in Trials Involving Equality Seeking Groups” (2009) 6:2 JL & Equality 201;
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “Re-Examining the Doctrine of Judicial Notice in the
Family Law Context” (1994) 26:3 Ottawa L Rev 551; RJR-MacDonald Inc v
Canada (AG), [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 151, 127 DLR (4th) 1 [RJR-MacDonald]; R v Spence, 2005 SCC 71 at para 68, [2005] 3 SCR 458.

11

Hagan, supra note 10 at 215.

12

See Kenneth Culp Davis, “An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process” (1942) 55:3 Harv L Rev 364 at 402–10.
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reviewing judges considered themselves at liberty to re-examine legislative
facts. Where trial judges relied on “complex social science evidence,” their
factual findings would merit less deference on the part of reviewing courts.13
Moreover, where lower courts were involved in constitutional balancing, deference to the trial judge’s factual inferences was likely to be even less, given
that the determination of a Charter infringement often requires “a broad review of social, economic, and political factors in addition to scientific facts.”14
Were a trial judge to stumble over the complexities of evidence from unfamiliar disciplines – a not entirely inconceivable occurrence, as I discuss
below – a low standard for intervention meant that appellate courts could
come to different conclusions based on the same evidence. Recently, however, the threshold for appellate review of legislative facts was raised: in the
absence of a palpable and overriding error, appellate courts are no longer
free to re-evaluate a trial judge’s determinations of social, or legislative,
fact.
In Canada (AG) v Bedford, the Supreme Court retreated from its earlier
position on appellate review of legislative facts. It set out two principal
reasons for why reviewing courts should no longer distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts with respect to the standard of review. First,
the time and resources involved in reviewing large volumes of evidence and
“reconciling differences between the experts, studies and research results,”
would duplicate the trial judge’s role and “increase the costs and delay in
the litigation process.”15 Second, according to the Supreme Court, “social
and legislative facts may be intertwined with adjudicative facts,” making it
nearly impossible for appellate courts to properly distinguish between the
two.16 Moreover, by 2013, constitutional rights adjudication and the associated reliance on social science evidence had “evolved significantly” since
the Supreme Court established different standards of review in 1995.17 In the
intervening years, the case law had favoured the presentation of social science evidence by an expert witness, the assessment of whom, both in terms
of credibility and content of their testimony, fell to the trial judge.18 Further,

13

RJR-MacDonald, supra note 10 at para 79.

14

Ibid at para 141.

15

Bedford, supra note 9 at para 51.

16

Ibid at para 52.

17

Ibid at para 53.

18

Ibid at paras 51–53.
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experience has demonstrated the importance of the trial judge’s role “in
preventing miscarriages of justice flowing from flawed expert evidence.”19
Accordingly, “[t]he distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts
can no longer justify gradations of deference.”20
In recent years, authors have pressed for precisely this sort of end to
the adjudicative-legislative fact distinction where appellate review is concerned.21 Michelle Bloodworth, for example, writes that the distinction between social and adjudicative facts is untenable, as all knowledge is imperfect, or subjective, whether it comes from a lay witness or an expert.22
Bloodworth argues that it is illogical for the Supreme Court to call for consideration of social and legislative facts when interpreting Charter rights,
while simultaneously denying the trial judge’s capacity to effectively deal
with this kind of evidence.23 Given the increased frequency with which
courts rely on vast amounts of empirical data to evaluate social policy, reevaluation of the evidence by a reviewing court of its own accord does not
promote judicial economy or the judicious use of resources. But is there
some merit in the now outdated idea that the “privileged position of the trial
judge,”24 does not extend to the evaluation of the kinds of facts considered
in crafting legislation? Stated otherwise, what are the consequences of do-

19

Ibid at para 53, citing The Honourable Stephen T Goudge, Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario: Policy and Recommendations, vol 3 (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 2008) [Goudge
Report]. The Goudge Report is the culmination of a commission of inquiry (the
Goudge Inquiry, headed by retired Justice Stephen T Goudge of the Ontario
Court of Appeal) into the problem of flawed forensic pathology, following the
wrongful conviction of several individuals based on the erroneous expert testimony of Dr Charles Smith, a forensic pathologist. While the Commission’s
mandate was limited to the subject of pediatric forensic pathology, the report
has come to be recognized as an authority on the use of scientific expert witnesses in Canadian adjudication.

20

Bedford, supra note 9 at para 53.

21

See e.g. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, “Social Science in Research and
Law” (1988) 43:6 American Psychologist 465 (calling for the abandonment of
the distinction and an end to the treatment of legislative facts as facts).

22

“A Fact is a Fact is a Fact: Stare Decisis and the Distinction Between Adjudicative and Social Facts in Bedford and Carter” (2014) 32:2 NJCL 193 at 209.

23

Ibid at 210.

24

RJR-MacDonald, supra note 10 at para 79.
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ing away with the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts and
enhancing the privileged status of the trial judge with respect to the evaluation of all evidence adduced in first instance?
As the first major policy-laden Charter decision reviewed by the Supreme Court since it confirmed the end of the adjudicative-legislative fact
distinction, Carter SCC sheds some light on the potential effects of effectively immunizing trial judges’ evidentiary findings from appellate review,
where that evidence is made up of empirical research by social scientists.
The end of the distinction places an enormous weight on the shoulders of
trial judges, many of whom are neither trained nor skilled in the methods
of the social sciences.25 At the very least, the revised standard of appellate
review leads to the increased importance of the role of the trial judge in
admitting, evaluating, weighing, and drawing inferences from legislative
and social facts.
The following parts seek to demonstrate that the trial decision in Carter
BCSC should serve as an example for other judges facing complex qualitative and quantitative evidence. At the same time, they also suggest that in
the hands of a different trial judge, the case could have become a cautionary
tale of the risk that layperson trial judges might misconstrue similarly vast
evidentiary records. The challenges identified are, of course, not unique to
first instance judges; appellate court judges are often no better equipped to
evaluate complex and contradictory social facts. But as a case makes its way
up the appeals process, the evidentiary record is scrutinized by increased
numbers of judges at each level of court, creating a sense of safety in numbers and consensus. As the number of judges increases, so do the chances
that the evidence will be examined by a judge with the requisite awareness of the risks and challenges associated with expert evidence from the
social sciences. Thus, the risk of uncritical reliance on unsound evidence,
or of misapprehension of complex scientific evidence, is minimized. The
new approach to appellate review of social facts, however, suggests that
trial judges must now be particularly adept at dealing with large volumes
of complex and conflicting empirical evidence. It is true that the questions
that gave rise to the modified standard of review – the distinct roles of trial
and appellate courts and the blending of different types of facts – needed to
be addressed.26 Scarce judicial resources can inhibit access to justice and it

25

See Conrad & Lazare, supra note 8, on jurists’ general lack of extra-legal training.

26

Bedford, supra note 9 at paras 51–52.
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is indeed the trial judge’s job to assess the credibility of witnesses, be they
lay or expert. The concern, however, is that under the new standard of appellate review, the consequences of a trial judge misinterpreting complex
evidence become graver, as the judge is given the final word on the evidentiary basis of significant decisions affecting polycentric and often divisive
social policy. But the risk can be minimized. As Justice Smith’s treatment
of the evidence suggests, the challenges associated with empirical evidence
may be overcome.

B. Why Carter BCSC
As an example worth following, the trial decision in Carter BCSC is
valuable in two respects. First, in evaluating the constitutionality of the ban
on assisted death, Justice Smith scrutinized an enormous amount of empirical evidence. The “considerable evidentiary record” included 36 binders containing 116 affidavits, some of which were “hundreds of pages in length and
[attached] as exhibits many secondary sources,” as well transcripts and other
documents.27 Much of that evidence was presented by expert witnesses, totalling 57 in number, 18 of whom were cross-examined.28 While the evidentiary
record was vast, it was not inordinate; Charter challenges to social policy
typically rely on a substantial evidentiary record and often draw heavily on
empirical evidence given by social scientists.29 Indeed, the absence of cogent evidence would create a risk of determining questions of “fundamental
importance to Canadian society” in a “factual vacuum.”30 Rights adjudication has profound effects of “the lives of Canadians.”31 As such, the relevant
facts “may cover a wide spectrum dealing with scientific, social, economic
and political aspects.”32 Thus, Carter BCSC exemplifies the judicial reliance
on social science data that often goes into constitutional rights balancing.
Second, it is worth considering what factors may have contributed to
Justice Smith’s thoughtful approach. Justice Smith’s lengthy career as a

27

Carter BCSC, supra note 2 at para 114.

28

Ibid at paras 114, 160.

29

See e.g. Bedford, supra note 9; Chaoulli, supra note 9.

30

Mackay v Manitoba, [1989] 2 SCR 357 at 361, 61 DLR (4th) 385.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid.
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legal academic prior to her appointment to the bench may be significant.
At the University of British Columbia, she served as dean of the Faculty of
Law, taught in a number of areas, including evidence, civil litigation, and
the Charter, and published articles in the fields of evidence, civil litigation,
and Charter equality rights.33 It is not surprising that she would have turned
her mind to the challenges discussed below – and to ways to mitigate some
of the attendant risks – before encountering them as a judge.34
In addition to her academic experience, Justice Smith has served on
the Board of Governors and as the Executive Director of the Ottawa-based
National Judicial Institute (NJI),35 which is devoted to improving justice
through judicial education in Canada and internationally.36 At the NJI, she
has been involved in training judges in Canada and abroad and has led
workshops on the Charter and evidence.37 Finally, her work in judicial and
legal education has also touched on the value of judicial impartiality.38 This
is not to say that only judges with the same history of scholarship and academic experience as Justice Smith will be equipped to deal with the intricate
nature of the evidence in complex policy adjudication. Indeed, one hope of
this paper is that all judges might strive to emulate the example of judicial
treatment of the evidence in Carter BCSC. Rather, Justice Smith’s background means simply that it is not surprising that her approach provides a
positive example for judges facing similarly complex and weighty evidentiary records.

33

Canadian Bar Association, “The Honourable Madam Justice Lynn Smith”,
online: CBA <www.cba.org/cba/cle/PDF/Constit09_Smith_bio.pdf> [CBA,
“Smith”]. See also Lynn Smith, “The Equality Rights” (1991) 20:2 Man LJ
377 (for an example of her scholarship on the Charter prior to her appointment
to the bench).

34

See e.g. Lynn Smith, “The Courts and Different Kinds of Objectivity” (1987)
45:1 Advocate 17 (on the importance of objectivity in judging).

35

Ibid; University of British Columbia, “The Honourable Lynn Smith, Q.C.”
(August 2015), online: UBC <president.ubc.ca/files/2015/08/brief_bio_lynn_
smith.pdf> [UBC, “Smith”].

36

National Judicial Institute, “About the NJI” (2014), online: NJI <www.nji-inm.
ca/index.cfm/about/about-the-nji/>.

37

UBC, “Smith”, supra note 35.

38

See The Law Society of British Columbia, “Minutes of the Benchers’ Meeting” (12 July 2013), online: LSBC <www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/about/minu
tes/2013-07-12.pdf>.
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II. The Judge as Layperson
Lack of training in scientific theories and methods may constitute one
of the principal barriers to law’s critical use of social science evidence.39
In many cases, judges and lawyers do not possess the skills required to
properly evaluate complex scientific evidence stemming from disciplines
traditionally understood as being outside of law. For instance, writing about
the Supreme Court of the United States’ treatment of the kind of evidence
typically tendered in policy-related adjudication, one American scholar describes judges’ and lawyers’ “lack of even a minimum acquaintance” with
science.40 Another observes the “incompetence” that characterizes the judicial use of empirical evidence.41 When examined in light of the statistical
nature of much of the evidence, as well as its contradictory and inconclusive
character, the trial decision in Carter BCSC, while an apparent exception
to these critiques, also serves to highlight some of the potential hazards of
judicial reliance on the social sciences. These limits extend to the jurist’s
ability to evaluate the validity and reliability of evidence from the social
sciences. What we are left with, then, is a judiciary that recognizes the need
to draw on empirical evidence but that, as will be discussed in this Part, may
not effectively use such evidence.
There are a number of consequences of this knowledge gap, but certain risks associated with uncritical reliance on the social sciences stand
out upon a close reading of Carter BCSC. Among them is the risk that in
the absence of real knowledge about science, judges might fall prey to the
“mystique of science,”42 and in turn struggle in their determination of what
constitutes expert evidence, ultimately accepting too much potentially unreliable empirical evidence. Further, limited capacity to critically evaluate
social science data in the courtroom means that judges may misinterpret

39
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the evidence or prefer evidence from one witness over another for reasons
unrelated to the validity or reliability of the evidence.

A. Discerning reliability in Carter BCSC
In dealing with expert evidence, trial judges play what has come to be
known as a “gatekeeping” role. As gatekeepers, trial judges should “screen
out proposed evidence whose value does not justify the risk of confusion,
time and expense that may result from its admission.”43 What constitutes
admissible expert evidence has developed incrementally. Trial judges’ determinations are now directed by a four-step test. To be admissible, evidence must be relevant and it must be “of necessity in assisting the trier of
fact.”44 Proposed expert evidence must also not be excluded by another rule
of evidence – for example, the general rule that in criminal proceedings, the
Crown cannot lead evidence to impugn the character of the accused.45 Last,
the evidence must be given by a “properly qualified expert” – that is, “a witness who has shown to have acquired special or peculiar knowledge through
study or experience in respect of the matters on which he or she undertakes
to testify.”46 These four steps are to be followed by a holistic weighing of the
costs and benefits associated with the evidence.47 At this stage, in the criminal context in which the test has been substantially developed, the judge
must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect on the accused.48 Experience suggests, however, that applying this test to evidence about human behaviour – that is, to much of the
evidence in Carter BCSC – is an exceedingly difficult task, even for trained
scientists.49 That judges with little to no training in the social sciences would
find the exercise challenging is unsurprising.
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The inability, on the part of some judges, to evaluate empirical evidence
has led to increased amounts of social science experts being permitted to
present their evidence in Canadian courtrooms. Referring to social scientists, experienced litigator Marlys Edwardh observed two decades ago “an
explosion of areas of expertise and of expert opinions.”50 Others write: “our
courtrooms have become ‘the showcase for the latest syndromes and theories offered by the scientific community.’”51 Most recently, Justice Doherty,
of the Ontario Court of Appeal, observed that “a deluge of experts has descended on the criminal courts ready to offer definitive opinions to explain
almost anything,” particularly where human behaviour is concerned.52 As
explained above, Carter BCSC was no exception to the proliferation of expert opinions about human behaviour. The decision is emblematic, in fact,
for its reliance on a legion of experts, all bringing distinct and contrasting
points of view on the questions before the court.
This explosion of expert knowledge, and the consequent pressure on
parties to support their arguments using expertise, creates the risk that courts
will be flooded with an excess of specialized knowledge and, in some cases,
knowledge that goes beyond the scope of a witness’s expertise. Aware of this
risk, the Supreme Court has consistently warned that “trial judges must be
vigilant in monitoring and enforcing the proper scope of expert evidence.”53
Where an expert’s evidence contains anecdotal evidence that “does not
speak to the particular facts before the Court,”54 or where it otherwise “strays

50
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51

Paciocco, “Coping With Expert Evidence”, supra note 49 at 306–7, citing Steven Skurka & Elsa Renzella, “Misplaced Trust: The Courts’ Reliance on the
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beyond its proper scope, it is imperative that the trial judge not assign any
weight to the inadmissible parts.”55 The Supreme Court has not however
precluded the admissibility of such evidence, thus creating the risk that this
kind of evidence of limited value might affect the trial judge’s reasoning.
In Carter BCSC, Dr. Hendin, a psychologist, provided expert testimony for the Attorney General. He was called for his expertise in suicide
prevention and the effects of the legalization of physician-assisted dying
in certain jurisdictions. On the issue of whether depression might affect
an individual’s desire to request assisted death, he testified “that a number of studies have shown that general practitioners are not reliably able to
diagnose depression, let alone determine whether depression is impairing
[a patient’s] judgment.”56 As an expert in suicide prevention however, and
not in competence assessment, he was not, in the opinion of Justice Smith,
equipped to provide compelling evidence on the assessment of competence
to choose assisted death, as he was called to do.57 Instead, Justice Smith
preferred the plaintiffs’ evidence, including that of Dr. Smith, a psychiatrist
and clinical professor, with “a great deal of experience in assessing cognitive functioning.”58
Likewise, Justice Smith remarked on the limits of evidence given by a
clinical psychologist and associate professor with respect to an individual’s
competence to request assisted death, as the witness stated on cross-examination that he had never, in his professional capacity as a psychologist, “been
involved in assessing someone’s capacity to make medical decisions and
that he is unfamiliar with the test for medical decision-making capacity.”59
Moreover, the studies relied on by that witness “did not involve people actually seeking physician-assisted dying,” but rather, dealt with “traditionally-defined suicide among older adults.”60 This stood in opposition to the
plaintiffs’ evidence on the same question, which included evidence from Dr.
Donnelly, a “specialist and Associate Professor of geriatric psychiatry” with
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“extensive practical experience doing competency assessments” and “who
teaches in that area.”61
Justice Smith was ostensibly adept at identifying – and mitigating –
the risks that flow from the presentation of unreliable evidence and the acceptance of evidence beyond a witness’s field of expertise. She did so by
carefully and expressly considering the extent and limits of the witnesses’
expertise in the subject at hand, both in terms of their experiences and the
methods by which they reached their conclusions. For example, with respect to the “feasibility of physicians assessing competence in the context of
physician-assisted death, [Justice Smith noted] the expertise and experience
of the psychiatrists” called by the plaintiffs,62 as contrasted with the expertise of some of the witnesses called by the Attorney General of Canada.63
Further, aware that the value of the evidence tendered varied according to
differing levels of expertise among the experts, Justice Smith did not appear
to place a disproportionate amount of weight on the evidence of one particular witness. Rather, her reasons refer to her analysis and weighing of the
evidence “taken as a whole.”64 While this approach appears commonsensical, the possibility remains that other judges may fall short in distinguishing
between similar but distinct fields of specialized knowledge.

B. Seeing beyond credentials in Carter BCSC
Appellate courts have long been aware of the danger that trial judges,
with little background on which to base their evaluation of a witness’s qualifications, might fail to distinguish between a competent expert and one who
boasts impressive credentials but lacks the requisite knowledge for the case
at hand. Unreliable evidence may be given undue weight when “submitted
through a witness of impressive antecedents.”65 The risk is that, deferring to
credentials, some judges might abdicate their responsibility for the ultimate
decision; it is much easier to rely on a pre-eminent expert in a given field
than to engage in a critical evaluation of the evidence presented. Comment-
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ing on the risk that judges will uncritically defer to credentialed experts,
one behavioural scientist writes that “modern Americans will embrace almost any psycholegal theory or claim that highly paid and highly arrogant
experts spin on the witness stand. We and our judges are blinded by jargon,
fancy-sounding credentials and fancy degrees.”66 While this observation
may depict a caricature, it is one that is nevertheless applicable in the Canadian context as well.67
In Carter BCSC, the risk of undue deference to demonstrated expertise
may not have been realized. But the potential for uncritical regard for expert
qualifications was present, given the list of witnesses put forward by parties on both sides of the litigation. Justice Smith heard evidence from veteran physicians in a number of medical fields ranging from gerontology, to
neurology, psychiatry, palliative care, and cardiology, as well experienced
professors of sociology, psychology, human rights, law, bioethics, and public health.68 Experts were affiliated with institutions such as Cornell University, Harvard University, the University of Toronto, and a number of other
respected universities. The plaintiffs, for example, tendered the evidence
of Dr. Marcia Angell, a physician and senior lecturer at Harvard Medical
School and the former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine, as well as Professor Sheila McLean, an emeritus professor in law and
ethics at the University of Glasgow and a former vice-chairperson of the
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO.69 Likewise, the Attorney
General of Canada relied on the evidence of Dr. Harvey Chochinov, a distinguished professor of psychiatry at the University of Manitoba and “the only
Canada Research Chair in palliative care.”70 It is not difficult to understand
the temptation for a layperson judge to simply defer to the expertise of such
an impressive roster of witnesses, many of whom spent years accumulating
knowledge in the field of assisted dying.
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That reasonable temptation underscores the importance of looking past
an expert’s credentials. Indeed, Justice Smith looked beyond the witnesses’
statuses as “impressive, respected researchers,”71 focusing instead on less
obvious markers of reliability. For example, in evaluating Baroness Finlay’s
evidence on whether safeguards can effectively prevent abuse of vulnerable
individuals, Justice Smith focused not on the witness’s membership in the
House of Lords, her “leading role in the debate about assisted suicide and
euthanasia in the United Kingdom,” or her status as a “very well-respected
palliative care physician.”72 Instead, in placing little weight on Baroness
Finlay’s critique of the opposing evidence, Justice Smith pointed to the nonempirical methodology underlying her evidence.73 Justice Smith’s capacity
to see past this long list of credentials might be attributable to her experience
with judicial education and training.74 But in such a situation, judges can
hardly be faulted for the natural temptation to uncritically defer to expert
witnesses, rather than attempt to look beyond the often wide-ranging credentials of experts to assess the substantive merit of their evidence. This is
not to deny the relevance of the educational background of expert witnesses,
but rather, to encourage, in addition to an assessment of their credentials,
the critical evaluation of their actual experience and of the methodologies
they employ.

C. How Carter BCSC differentiates empirical methodologies
The difficulty that many judges might face in evaluating empirical data
does not end once an expert’s professional qualifications and the subject
matter of the evidence have passed the gatekeeping stage. Commentators
in the United States have characterized judges as “[ranging] from closet
Einsteins to proud Luddites” in their knowledge of scientific methodologies.75 More than being untrained in the sciences, American judges have
been known to resist instruction in matters with which they should have
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at least some familiarity. Professors Conley and Peterson, experienced in
training judges in science, recount judges’ statements that “studying methodology is too abstract, mere theory.”76 The professors’ “uniform experience
with hundreds of judges at every level is that the judges think methodology
is something for academics to worry about.”77 While the same resistance has
not been documented in Canada, it remains true that many judges have no
background in the social or natural sciences.78
Judicial inexperience with scientific concepts and methodologies has
obvious consequences with respect to the evaluation of empirical evidence.
The case law demonstrates that some trial judges, untrained in the differing
methodologies of distinct areas of inquiry, may confuse evidentiary reliability and scientific validity, and hold evidence to an inappropriate standard.
In R v Abbey, for example, the trial judge was found to have misinterpreted
expert evidence because he applied the language of quantitative research
methods – “error rates,” “random sampling,” “peer review,” and “[replication of] findings” – to evidence based on qualitative sociological research,
clinical experience, and “familiarity with the relevant academic literature.”79
The Ontario Court of Appeal wrote that “[i]t was unhelpful to assess [the
expert’s] evidence against factors that were entirely foreign to [the expert’s]
methodology.”80 The trial decision in Abbey is a fitting example of the judicial mistreatment of empirical evidence due to its complex or technical
nature. The result is the risk that trial judges may decide policy-related questions based on evidence that they may not fully grasp.81
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Justice Smith’s reasons contain a number of signs that she was proficient
at understanding the empirical evidence before her. Alongside her comments on statistical or empirical studies are references to the methodologies
employed by the authors and how those methodologies affected the data relied on. For example, with respect to the “Ganzini Depression Study,” relied
on as part of her survey of legislative regimes governing assisted dying in
Oregon and Washington, Justice Smith demonstrated an acute awareness of
the limitations of quantitative studies. She explicitly recognized that the reliability of such studies depends in part on response rates, as acknowledged
by the authors of the study themselves.82 Where sample sizes for another
qualitative study were small, she recognized this among other limitations,
ascribing an appropriate amount of weight to such evidence and using the
study to provide context for the related quantitative data.83 Likewise, Justice
Smith acknowledged further instances where the generalizability of data
flowing from quantitative studies was limited by sample size and other factors, and accordingly relied on some of this evidence as part of the broader
context of the litigation rather than for its specific content.84 Further, Justice
Smith distinguished between more and less reliable evidence, according to
the methods by which it was gathered or obtained. For example, the weight
of evidence was weakened where it was based on second-hand knowledge
only, of an article or a film.85 Finally, Justice Smith was explicit about placing more weight on an expert opinion based on “evidence-based thinking”
than on one that that departed from the mainstream.86
Justice Smith does not appear to have deferred unquestioningly – to
either experts or their evidence – in the face of conflicting empirical data
from disciplines outside of the law. This is unsurprising given her extrajudicial writings, wherein she acknowledges the limits of certain types of quan-
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titative data, stemming from ethical restrictions, the creation of simulated
situations, and the inability to corroborate results.87 Indeed, the reasons in
Carter BCSC make a number of references to the inconclusive nature of
the evidence and the impossibility of arriving at firm conclusions on certain matters, such as the potential impact on palliative care of legalizing
physician-assisted death in Canada.88 Thus, in her reasons in Carter BCSC
and elsewhere, Justice Smith demonstrates a keen awareness of both the
usefulness and the limits of social science evidence generally, by accepting
that controversial social policy matters will rarely lend themselves to clear
or discrete answers.
Justice Smith’s other work also sheds light on the rationale behind her
methodical review of the immense evidentiary record in Carter BCSC. In a
2011 speech at the University of New Brunswick, the judge spoke at length
about the importance of writing reasons.89 Reasons that contain a detailed
and clear explanation of the evidence itself, as well as of the judge’s reasoning in distinguishing between stronger and weaker evidence, confer a
sense of legitimacy on the ultimate decision.90 The effect of this approach
is that the more complicated and lengthy the evidentiary record, the longer
the resulting decision. The evidence in Carter BCSC was far from straightforward. That the record contained several differing and contradictory
points of view, stemming from distinct areas of inquiry, and dealing with a
number of questions related to legalizing physician-assisted death in Canada and abroad, helps to explain the length of the decision, which spanned
1416 paragraphs and almost 400 pages.
Canadians should expect, as a matter of course, that judges tasked
with adjudicating social policy should be adept at sifting through voluminous records and evaluating not only the evidentiary claims put forward by
the parties but also the means by which these claims were reached. But it
should be evident at this stage that many Canadian judges are, by no fault
of their own, not always equipped to make these difficult determinations
where empirical data from qualified experts in fields far from the judge’s
legal expertise point in multiple directions and the law seeks a single an-
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swer. Faced with the same value-laden social policy question that Justice
Smith was confronted with in Carter BCSC, it is easy to imagine that some
judges might have more difficulty in drawing the factual conclusions that
will form the basis of their decisions. Indeed, experience and scholarship
indicate that many judges may not have fared as well.91 The severity of the
problem becomes clear when considering that under the Supreme Court’s
new approach to reviewing legislative facts, absent a serious error, a single
judge has the final say on how empirical evidence is to be interpreted, even
where the evidence is contradictory or where expert opinions are derived
from methodologies foreign to the judge.
The trial decision in Carter BCSC suggests that these issues, while serious, are not insurmountable. Nor are these issues novel, although they may
be exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s new approach to legislative facts.
Carter BCSC demonstrates that with cautious deliberation, missteps can be
avoided. Further, as I discuss briefly below, the legal system might move
toward mitigating the risks. But before thinking about ways forward, the
following Part will draw out some further challenges to adjudicating social
policy, the source of which lies not in the judicial role but in the role of the
expert witness.

III. Tackling the Perils of Expertise
Thus far, this paper has set out some of the principal dangers inherent in judicial reliance on empirical evidence arising out of the lack of
judicial expertise in evaluating empirical research. It has highlighted the
presence of those dangers and suggested that Justice Smith’s approach in
avoiding some of the typical missteps in the judicial treatment of social
science evidence is one to be emulated. This Part will shift the focus away
from the judge and onto the expert witness in order to draw out similar institutional difficulties with litigating social facts. Specifically, it examines the
existence of bias among expert witnesses, with “bias” being defined as the
“predisposing influences that can tincture the accuracy of expert testimony”
resulting from a lack of independence or impartiality,92 and demonstrates
how these issues were overcome in Carter BCSC.
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Due to its heavy reliance on social science evidence, Carter BCSC is
fertile ground for exploring the typical delivery of that evidence in the form
of expert testimony. The role of the expert witness is to “provide assistance
to the court in understanding matters which are beyond the expertise of the
trier of fact.”93 While experts are called by parties to the dispute, their duty
is to provide a neutral and independent opinion on the issue before the court,
and not to advocate for the party that retained them.94 The nature of the adversarial system, however, wherein parties pay for an expert’s service, might
naturally affect their independence.95 Indeed, the Carter BCSC decision is
a prime example of the ways in which bias, conscious or unconscious, can
creep into the courtroom as an inevitable consequence of the adversarial
system of adjudication. While Justice Smith appears to have weeded out
much of the problematic evidence, giving less weight to lower value testimony, the decision suggests that the potential for bias was present at trial
and that the same potential biases will continue to arise as long as courts
rely on experts, a necessary corollary to the use of empirical evidence. The
following paragraphs will examine some of the ways in which expert bias
manifests itself in the trial process. The hope is that mere awareness on the
part of lawyers and trial judges of the ways in which bias can flow from trial
proceedings – and the ways in which its impacts may be mitigated – will
encourage caution and deliberation on the part of trial judges in accepting
and relying on the evidence of social science experts.

A. Adversarial litigation and the polarization of opinions in Carter
BCSC
The adversarial system has been characterized by the “polarization of
opinions” it produces.96 Nowhere is this polarization more evident than in
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the competing testimony of opposing expert witnesses testifying on the
same subject but expressing conflicting opinions. The trial in Carter BCSC
typified the phenomenon of expert witnessing, as Justice Smith heard testimony from 57 experts. This is unsurprising given the controversial and
divisive nature of the issues in Carter BCSC and the role of the expert in
assisting the court by bringing clarity to complex information. Often however, rather than reveal the truth or illuminate the subject for the judge, the
polarization of views may have the effect of distorting the subject matter.97
Indeed, “duelling experts make bad teachers.”98 Further, the difficulty of
uncovering the facts from what is presented by experts is compounded by
the “natural human tendency to feel the need to do your best for the side
you represent.”99 This kind of adversarial bias is “an almost inevitable consequence” of giving evidence within the current adversarial context,100 and
it has the potential to turn impartial experts into advocates for the retaining
party’s case.101
Where adversarial bias may be most deceptive and likely to affect honest
witnesses is in its creation of confirmation bias or, the “unconscious tendency of those who desire a particular outcome to search for things that support
that outcome and to ignore or reinterpret contradictory information.”102 The
spin or selective presentation that may result from confirmation bias can be
particularly dangerous for witnesses who depend on “subjective judgment
or experience rather than objective science to achieve their opinions.”103
Even where evidence is conclusive, which it often is not, testimony may be
“[coloured] either consciously or subconsciously by personal and professional prejudices.”104

Queensland U of Technology L & Justice J 89 at 90.
97

Ibid.

98

Binnie, supra note 78 at 324.

99

Davies, supra note 96 at 91.

100

Ibid at 89.

101

See Paciocco, “Jukebox Testimony”, supra note 92.

102

Ibid at para 17.

103

Ibid.

104

David A Thompson, “Should Reliable Scientific Evidence Be Conclusive and
Binding on the Jury?” (1971) 48:1 Chicago-Kent L Rev 39 at 46–47.

2016

Judging the Social Sciences in Carter v Canada (AG)

S61

Finally, the adversarial system of adjudication fosters confirmation
bias by encouraging the sharing of theories and objectives between parties
and their experts. The system thus promotes a “sense of joint venture” or
“esprit de corps.”105 One social scientist experienced in giving expert testimony confirms this idea: in helping counsel organize their case, “[e]xpert
witnesses do not merely give their opinions; they join a company.”106 Experts will often work with counsel on multiple aspects of the case, and not
always limit their involvement to the distinct point on which they testify.107
This sense of cooperation gives rise to the phenomenon of “noble cause
distortion [or] corruption,” that is, “the distorting effect that can occur from
believing that you are on the side of the good.”108 According to this phenomenon, “[e]xpert witnesses who think that they are serving the public interest
by testifying, particularly by combating reprehensible practices or conduct,
can fall victim to this form of partiality.”109 The brief biographies of the experts in Carter BCSC demonstrate that many had devoted lengthy careers to
researching and writing about physician-assisted death, some clearly sitting
on one side of the debate.110 It is only natural that some might have come to
the case with preconceptions of what constitutes the good.
Of course it is not possible to measure the level of bias that resulted
from the use of partisan experts in Carter BCSC. But the potential existence of bias – and the care with which Justice Smith approached the expert
testimony – should nevertheless serve as both a caution and a lesson to
parties and to triers of fact faced with lists of carefully selected experts on
controversial social matters.

B. Rising above bias in Carter BCSC
There is no effective means of evaluating the degree to which the expert
testimony in Carter BCSC was affected by bias. But the nature of the case
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and some of the evidence tendered suggest that it was not immune from the
typical dangers of expert evidence. Confirmation bias may well have been
present at trial. Recall that confirmation bias may be especially dangerous
where evidence does not stem from an “objective science.”111 Some authors
would not characterize the social sciences as an objective science; they have
been described as the “least accurate scientific evidence,” and serious doubt
has been expressed as to their probative value.112 Justice Binnie has written
that the “softer sciences, such as psychology,” lend themselves less easily to
“testing, critique and the generation of error rates.”113 Similarly, Professor
Dworkin argues that the social sciences are more “fragile” than harder sciences.114 At the same time, it must be recognized that social science studies
can be more or less rigorous depending on the methodology used and the
sample size. Many social science experts whose research involves quantitative and statistical analysis would dispute the idea that their work is less
accurate or should have less probative value than the data produced by the
physical sciences. When it comes to assessing scientific rigour, statistical
inquiry and quantitative research should not be lumped together with qualitative research based on interviews of small sample groups.115 But the observations of Justice Binnie and Professor Dworkin may nevertheless hold true
with respect to certain forms of social science evidence. By its nature, given
that it is less easily replicated and confirmed by further research, qualitative
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social science evidence, which constituted a significant portion of the record
in Carter BCSC, heightens the risk of confirmation bias.
Much of the evidence admitted by Justice Smith came from psychologists, ethicists, sociologists, human rights experts, and legal researchers specializing in assisted dying. Moreover, the evidence given by some of the
medical doctors had less to do with physiological processes, that is to say
objectively verifiable data, and more to do with their experiences treating
patients at the end of life. At a general level, the experts in Carter BCSC
cannot be described as the prototypical “jukebox witness” – that is, as witnesses who “would play any tune in [their] testimony that [they were] paid
to play.”116 Indeed, many of them testified based on years of experience
researching physician-assisted death and did not appear to change their
opinions to suit the party who had retained them. But the risks described
above suggest that this sort of evidence may nevertheless be vulnerable to
the subtle ways in which adversarial bias creeps into trial proceedings.
Justice Smith was aware of the potential for personal bias to affect
expert testimony. In evaluating the evidentiary value of the Battin et al.
study on whether safeguards in place in the Netherlands and Oregon effectively prevent abuse of vulnerable individuals, she expressed her doubt
with respect to the impartiality of a critic of the study. Testifying for the
Attorney General of Canada on the Battin et al. study, Dr. Pereira had spoken “from his deep and sincere conviction that assisted death is wrong and
unnecessary.”117 Referring to another witness for the Attorney General, Dr.
Hendin, Justice Smith wrote that “his passion on the topic, left [her] in some
doubt as to his impartiality.”118 The Battin et al. study, on the other hand,
was conducted by “highly qualified empirical researchers” who conducted
a “rigorous” analysis, according to Professor Battin.119 Further evidence on
the same question was presented by Dr. Ganzini, a witness for the plaintiffs,
whose objectivity was bolstered by the fact that her views on best practices
with respect to certain types of patient requests had changed over the course
of her long-term study of assisted death.120 This sort of distinction suggests
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that Justice Smith was attuned to the warning signs of bias and to the idea
that “dogmatism is an important indicator of bias or partiality.”121 Indeed,
“[e]xpert witnesses betray their predispositions by being uncompromising and unwilling to modify their opinions when factual assumptions are
changed or when compelling opposing positions are presented.”122 Justice
Smith thus accepted the evidence that “the availability of assisted death in
those jurisdictions has not inordinately impacted persons who might be seen
as ‘socially vulnerable.’”123
Similarly, the case was not immune to the risk that subjective judgment
or experience might taint an expert’s neutrality. Some of the opinions expressed by medical experts were anecdotal, based as they were on personal
involvement with patients rather than on statistical or empirical data. Dr.
Bentz, for example, testifying for the Attorney General of Canada on the
inefficiency of safeguards in place in Oregon, based his evidence on his
experience with a terminally ill patient.124 Such anecdotal evidence is problematic in at least two interrelated ways. First, evidence based on personal
experience cannot be relied on as representative overall. When considering
evidence for the purpose of evaluating social policy, one individual’s experience on a particular occasion does little to illuminate the broader issues and
will therefore be of little assistance to the judge. Second, necessarily subjective in nature, anecdotal evidence offers only an individualized perspective
on the question at hand. Without more than a personal view, the evidence
cannot be tested or confirmed in order to draw generalized conclusions on
broader societal views or interests. Indeed, in the accepted hierarchy of scientific evidentiary sources, opinions based on the expert’s personal experience rank the lowest.125 Contrasted with the statistical evidence tendered on
the same subject, Justice Smith identified Dr. Bentz’s evidence as anecdotal,
preferring the plaintiff’s evidence stating that the oversight process works
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fairly well in Oregon.126 Justice Smith did not expressly reject Dr. Bentz’s
evidence, but she was attuned to the dangers of anecdotal, or experiential,
evidence given by experts and to the importance of relying on “evidencebased expert evidence”127 over evidence based on personal experience.
The judge’s critical approach to evidence based on personal experience
was later reinforced by the Supreme Court. In Carter SCC, the Supreme
Court was asked to evaluate fresh evidence submitted by the Attorney General on the slippery slope argument against the decriminalization or legalization of physician-assisted death. Specifically, the Attorney General sought
to advance evidence that permitting the practice will result in illegitimate
deaths of “decisionally vulnerable” patients and send Canada down “the
slippery slope into euthanasia and condoned murder.”128 The evidence consisted of an affidavit from Professor Montero, a bioethics professor called
as an expert on euthanasia in Belgium, which detailed “a number of recent,
controversial and high profile cases of assistance in dying in Belgium which
would not fall within the parameters suggested in [the Supreme Court’s]
reasons.”129 In addressing the affidavit, the Supreme Court cautioned against
judicial overreliance on anecdotal or individualized evidence, which may
not be generalizable to the legal and social context of the case. The Court
endorsed Justice Smith’s detailed analysis of the evidence as a whole: “[t]he
resolution of the issue before us falls to be resolved not by competing anecdotes, but by the evidence.”130 Thus the Supreme Court confirmed the need
for careful attention in mitigating some of the potential dangers of expertise,
particularly where expert evidence is anecdotal in nature.
The contrast between the different types of evidence tendered on the
same question – anecdotal on the one hand and statistical/empirical on the
other – illustrates how the above-described dangers associated with expert
testimony make their way into the adjudicative process and that certain
forms of evidence are more likely to give rise to a greater risk of bias. As
Justice Smith’s treatment of the evidence demonstrates, however, awareness
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of the distorting effects of bias and express acknowledgement of this danger
can go a long way toward mitigating its potential destructive impacts on
judicial decision making.

Conclusion: Judging the Social Sciences After Carter
In Charter disputes about controversial social policy affecting large
numbers of Canadians, the Supreme Court often has the final judicial say.
But the fact that two appellate courts will normally review the trial decision
does not diminish the significance of the trial judge’s role. In exercising the
gatekeeping function and determining what weight to ascribe to each piece
of evidence, it is the first instance judge who creates the evidentiary basis
both for her decision and for subsequent appeals. Given that appellate courts
are no longer at liberty to review a trial judge’s findings of legislative fact, it
follows that today more than ever it is essential that trial judges treat social
science evidence correctly and effectively. However, as I have suggested,
the adversarial method of presenting evidence does not always facilitate
correct and effective treatment of empirical evidence.
The trial decision in Carter BCSC demonstrates that the challenges
flowing from adversarial adjudication need not undermine the reasoned
resolution of disputes about social policy. The risks diminish as judges
demonstrate greater sensitivity to the difficulties associated with judging
large amounts of conflicting empirical data. Justice Smith’s approach to the
record in Carter BCSC enabled her to avoid some of the characteristic missteps associated with judicial reliance on contested evidence about human
behaviour. But demonstration alone is rarely an effective pedagogical tool
and questions remain about how the legal system can assist judges in applying the same discriminating approach to similar evidence.
Precise methods of creating discriminating users of empirical evidence
are beyond the limited scope of this paper, which aims simply to highlight
one example of thoughtful treatment of this kind of evidence. Nevertheless,
in reading Carter BCSC, some methods of promoting judicial capacity to
evaluate empirical data come to mind. For instance, the common law on the
independence of expert witnesses might benefit from a stricter threshold
for admissibility. The Supreme Court recently ruled that an obvious lack of
independence on the part of an expert witness should affect the admissibility
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of that expert’s evidence.131 But only in the clearest of cases does an expert’s
inability to provide objective evidence render the evidence inadmissible –
for example, where an expert “assumes the role of an advocate … ”132 Given
the subtle and nuanced ways that bias can creep into adversarial proceedings, particularly in social policy cases where judges hear from large numbers of partisan experts, the line between expertise and advocacy can be
difficult to trace.133 By maintaining a “not particularly onerous” threshold
for admissibility, according to which a personal, professional, or financial
interest alone does not preclude admissibility,134 the law provides little help
in mitigating the risks associated with expert testimony.
On a more rudimentary level, the legal system as a whole might do more
to foster familiarity among lawyers and judges with the methods of other intellectual disciplines, particularly those on which the law regularly draws.135
Law schools would do well to instil in students a sense of literacy with
respect to the complex evidentiary concepts they may encounter as jurists,
by creating courses that aim to “enable students to become more sophisticated consumers of science and understand its relationship with law.”136
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What such courses might look like and where they would fit into the law
school curriculum are questions for further reflection.137
Canadian judges are regularly called upon to decide divisive questions
affecting social policy and impacting the lives of many. To do so effectively, they must regularly rely on the work of empirical researchers who
study human behaviour and evaluate the impact of laws and social policies.
As in Carter BCSC, rights adjudication with wide-ranging effects requires
judges to critically appraise the work of empirical researchers, in the form
of expert evidence, so as to establish the factual bases for their often controversial decisions. In the preceding pages, I have attempted to demonstrate
that while judicial reliance on social science data is vital to the interpretation of Charter rights and freedoms, institutional limits and the structure
of adjudication may give rise to a danger that complex evidence will be
misconstrued or misinterpreted by trial judges. This danger is all the more
serious in a context where a single trial judge typically has the final word
on the significance of the varied and often inconclusive evidence. But as the
treatment of the evidence at trial in Carter BCSC makes clear, this danger
can be overcome.
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